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ABSTRACT. 
In recent decades, market-opening policies in local public transport (LPT) have impacted most 
European countries. However, we can observe a high degree of variability in possible LPT 
arrangements, from public monopolies to open markets. This work addresses the following 
research question: How does user satisfaction correlate to alternative organisational models of 
LPT service provision? We use the results of a large survey conducted in 2009 in 33 European 
cities to analyse the likelihood of satisfaction with standard probit models. Results show that the 
highest levels of satisfaction correlate with the presence of a single LPT provider, as opposed to 
an industry structure in which multiple providers operate in the same market area.  
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1. Introduction 
Local public transport (LPT) includes all those passenger services provided to the 
public on a non-discriminatory basis according to pre-established tariffs, routes and 
timetables, and that are designed to meet users’ mobility requirements on a small (urban) 
or medium (inter-urban) territorial scale (Zatti, 2012). 
Prior to the 1960s, most LPT systems covered their costs through tariffs and needed 
only limited transfers of funds from municipalities or other government bodies. 
However, subsequent investments in road networks and increasing rates of motorisation 
led to reductions in the demand for public transport. This change created a need for new 
organisational forms in order to reduce operating costs without affecting service quality. 
Over the past three decades, many nations and urban areas introduced competition in 
the field of LPT service provisioning (Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer, 1993). As a result, 
LPT systems now operate under a broad variety of organisational forms (Nash, 2005). 
Dealing with such heterogeneity, the relevant question is which such form has led to the 
best results for users. 
Many works have attempted to address this issue by investigating the link between 
alternative forms of governance in LPT service provisioning and the efficient 
provisioning of service, as measured in terms of operating cost savings. To the best of 
our knowledge, however, there has been no empirical investigation of the relationship 
between the organisation of LPT and customer satisfaction. The aim of this paper is to 
fill this gap, as looking at individual satisfaction with LPT services is not only 
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interesting in its own right but is also relevant in relation to policy implications (Warner 
and Hefetz, 2008). To investigate this relationship, we will exploit a survey conducted 
in 2009 across several European Union (EU) cities that focused on users’ satisfaction 
with LPT, among other issues. As for the classification of public transport systems, we 
suggest going beyond the ownership structure of providers, as the public-private 
dichotomy cannot be easily defined. As Van de Velde (1999) has pointed out, real 
world examples are far from being “pure organisational forms”, as a large number of 
intermediate situations exist that are shaped by legal, regulatory and organisational 
frameworks, with country-specific, or even city-specific, environmental factors needing 
to be considered, as well. This may be a confounding factor in any empirical analysis. 
Hence, the number of providers may be a less ambiguous indicator of the actual 
organisation of a LPT system. Local transport has certain features of a natural 
monopoly because the time and route slots are unique and there is a need to coordinate 
time plans and stops. 4  Moreover, public transport operations are also subject to 
economies of scale (Berechman and Giuliano, 1985; Farsi et al., 2007). As a 
consequence, it may be assumed that the number of providers has an effect on firms’ 
profitability and, indirectly, on the quality of the service captured by consumer 
satisfaction metrics. Thus, we have tested whether the latter increased when more than 
one company operated in a given market. While intense competition—at least in the 
                                                 
4 Here we refer to market shares in the operating area and a monopoly is defined with reference to the 
operating area. 
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form of tendering for routes—should increase efficiency, cost-saving activities may 
affect quality of service and passengers may negatively perceive increased 
diseconomies of coordination. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we briefly 
summarise the most recent reforms undertaken in the LPT sector across the EU and 
discuss the literature devoted to the study of the effects of such changes. In the third 
section, we present our data set in greater detail. In the fourth section, we briefly present 
the empirical methodology applied in this study and, in the fifth section, we discuss our 
results. Some comments and policy implications are presented in the sixth and final 
section. 
2. Background 
2.1. New organisational models in LPT 
The provisioning of LPT in Europe has undergone marked change in recent decades. 
These changes, which have been the results of regulatory reforms at both the EU and 
the national levels, have led to institutional changes and to the emergence of new 
organisational models. EU Regulation 1370/2007 repealed a nearly 40-year old piece of 
legislation devoted to public passenger transport service.5 This regulation left local 
                                                 
5  According to EU Regulation 1191/69, in order to ensure adequate transport services, transport 
authorities were allowed to impose some public service obligations on operators and, in return, to 
compensate them for the financial impact of the costs incurred in complying with these commitments. 
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transport authorities free to choose either to provide the transport services themselves or 
to delegate the role of service provider to external operators, selected through 
competitive tendering. This choice would have to be unambiguous in order to ensure the 
transparency of the management (Zatti, 2012). As Van de Velde (2008) pointed out, the 
EU regulatory development followed reforms carried out at the end of the 20th century 
in some European countries that were aimed at introducing some degree of competition 
into the LPT industry. 
The biggest step toward deregulation in the EU was the Transport Act 1985, enacted by 
the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom (UK). The act introduced the 
deregulation of bus services in the UK, with the exclusion of Northern Ireland and the 
metropolitan area of London—the latter due to concerns about the effects of free entry 
on congestion and on the coordination between different modes of transport (Zatti, 
2012). The Transport Act 1985 removed quantity licensing and forced local authorities 
to sell their municipally owned public transport companies. Public enterprises were 
privatised in small enough sections so as to prevent any one private company from 
gaining market dominance. Although the 1985 act constituted a landmark piece of 
legislation in favour of the deregulation of LPT services, the British experience has 
                                                                                                                                               
Nevertheless, as Van de Velde (2008) pointed out, the modality of reimbursement was not clearly defined 
and the issue of opening the market to international operators was not addressed. 
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remained an isolated example. In most EU countries, LPT systems are still operated by 
the local transport authorities.6 
Those countries in which a transport authority—tasked with defining the services to be 
supplied—is combined with external operators selected through competitive tendering 
represent an intermediate situation. Examples of such a system include France—
excluding Paris—London, Sweden and Denmark.7 
Given the variety of LPT models that exist in the marketplace, the link between the 
alternative organisational forms and the quality of the services provided is a relevant 
issue. Many studies have sought to address this issue from an empirical perspective, 
mainly looking at the effects of institutional reforms on operating cost savings. Van de 
Velde and Wallis (2013) assessed the effects of British deregulation, pointing out the 
subsequent increase in productivity. Nevertheless, they recognised that the scope of this 
gain was close to that observed in the case of London, where full deregulation was 
never implemented. They also analysed LPT in New Zealand, a nation characterised by 
a deregulated regime in which commercial services and contracted—or subsidised—
services coexist, and described the difficulties encountered in trying to integrate the two, 
                                                 
6 Austria and Germany represent two peculiar cases as, in principle, market initiatives play a leading role 
(Zatti, 2012). However, such an organisational model has never worked and LPT systems almost 
everywhere are controlled by local transport authorities (Van de Velde, 2007).  
7 Even if the latter two countries could be considered a homogeneous group, differences exist in their 
respective tendering procedures (Van de Velde, 2008). 
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as well as the low level of competition for the provisioning of contracted transport 
services. Preston and Almutairi (2013) contrasted the broader British experience with 
evidence from London. In the former, the authors claimed that the decline in the 
demand for public transport—and the corresponding decline in consumer welfare—was 
more than compensated for by the savings in operating costs. On the other hand, they 
pointed out the simultaneous gains realised by both customers and providers in London. 
Cox and Duthion (2001) presented case studies from both US and European contexts 
that suggested that full deregulation—such as the regime adopted in the UK outside of 
London—has led to significant savings in operating costs, coupled with a sharp increase 
in fares and a decline in service quality. Boitani et al. (2013) performed a Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) analysis on a set of companies operating in large EU cities. Their 
findings suggested a strong link between low levels of productivity and public 
ownership. Piacenza (2006) investigated how subsidisation mechanisms affect the cost 
efficiency of public transit systems by applying a cost frontier model to an Italian data 
set. Piacenza highlighted a scope for transport policy to increase X-efficiency 
(Leibenstein, 1966), stressing the importance of incentive theory and modern regulatory 
economics for the production analysis of regulated utilities. Iseki (2004), focussing on 
the US experience with LPT privatisation, was cautious in making statements 
concerning the link between form of governance and efficiency. Gómez-Ibáñez and 
Meyer (1997), based on a comparison of LPT systems in three countries, claimed that 
privatisation can be said to have led to lower operating costs only if a minimum amount 
of competition was introduced.  
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From a theoretical point of view, the relative advantages and disadvantages of different 
privatisation and liberalisation reforms has depended on the nature of the industry 
(Small and Verhoef, 2007). Several authors (e.g., Ceriani and Florio, 2011; Florio, 2013; 
Willner and Grönblom, 2011) have analysed the effects of regulatory reforms in 
network industries, concluding that a shift from public to private ownership cannot be 
said to be certain to improve welfare, as its effects on consumers’ surplus depends on a 
variety of issues and conditions (Winston, 1998). 
2.2. Customers’ satisfaction with LPT 
Most of the works reviewed in the previous section analysed the role of organisational 
form in LPT from the perspective of the firm—i.e., by focussing on indicators of 
efficiency and productivity. To the authors’ knowledge, however, there is no paper that 
has directly examined the association between consumers’ subjective satisfaction with 
the LPT sector and the LPT sector’s organisational form. This paper aims to address this 
gap. Even if this perspective is new to the literature, several previous papers have been 
devoted to the investigation of the determinants of customer satisfaction with urban 
public transport.  
A first group of works includes studies focused on comparisons undertaken of LPT 
systems operated in different cities. Fellesson and Friman (2008), for instance, used the 
results of a cross-national survey of LPT satisfaction among residents of nine large EU 
cities to claim that the perceived quality of the service was dependent on the industry 
characteristics, which were defined in terms of the infrastructure and technology 
employed. Diana (2011) employed the results of a survey on multimodal travellers—i.e., 
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those who used both a private car and urban public transport in their daily commute—
across a set of Italian cities to find a clear association between satisfaction and city size, 
with more satisfied travellers tending to live in smaller towns. Hine and Scott (2000) 
presented evidence from Scotland that focused on interchange and travel choice, in 
which context they pointed out the relevance and quality of information and the 
coordination of services as determinants of customer satisfaction. Wisniewski (2001) 
applied the SERQUAL survey model to Scottish data,8 stressing the importance of 
survey analyses in assessing customer satisfaction.  
A second set of contributions focused on a single environment, and therefore presented 
scenarios in which the quality of the service could be more easily measured and 
assessed. Cantwell et al. (2009) presented the results of a study on Dublin and suggested 
that the reliability of the service and the trip duration—in particular, trip duration during 
rush hours versus trip duration during the rest of the day—had a significant effect on 
customer satisfaction. Thompson and Schofield (2007) considered the Greater 
Manchester region in indicating that ease of use—rather than efficiency or safety—was 
the main component of satisfaction. Friman et al. (2001) analysed the results of a survey 
about customer satisfaction with public transport conducted in Sweden to suggest a 
strong link between satisfaction, reliability and simplicity of information. Also using 
Swedish data, Pedersen et al. (2011) analysed the differences in perceived quality 
between occasional and regular users of LPT. Their results showed that habitual car 
                                                 
8 See Parasuraman et al. (1988) for further details on the SERQUAL survey model. 
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users reported greater satisfaction than they had initially expected after using public 
transport for a period of one month. The shift from one transport mode to another, in 
general, seems to make people more conscious of their travel happiness. A similar 
conclusion was reached by Abou-Zeid et al. (2012) in a survey conducted in 
Switzerland. Outside of Europe, Ji and Gao (2010) estimated a logistic model that 
included socio-economic characteristics of the respondents in their set of explanatory 
variables and found significant results for age and income. Jen and Hu (2003), in their 
study on the Taipei LPT system, underscored the role of service quality and price in 
explaining customer satisfaction. 
3. The data 
3.1. Survey data on customer satisfaction 
The collecting of Eurobarometer survey data in recent decades has allowed the 
European Commission to monitor the evolution of public opinion in EU Member States, 
thereby aiding in the evaluation of different EU policies meant to address various topics, 
such as intent to vote and media use as well citizens’ satisfaction with life in general. 
Flash Eurobarometer surveys are ad hoc thematic telephone interviews conducted at the 
request of any service of the European Commission and enable the Commission to 
relatively quickly obtain results.  
In 2009, a Flash Eurobarometer survey was conducted that was devoted to assessing the 
quality of life in a selection of major European cities (European Commission, 2010). A 
random sample of 500 respondents in each city was asked about their satisfaction with 
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services such as public transport, health-care services and sport facilities. Respondents 
were asked to choose from among four possible answers: very unsatisfied, rather 
unsatisfied, rather satisfied and very satisfied; they were also asked how often they used 
public transport and/or how much time they spent travelling. Considering LPT, both 
satisfaction and attitudes were found to significantly vary across Europe. Figure 1 
shows the ratio of satisfied respondents (i.e., those who answered either “very satisfied” 
or “rather satisfied”) and unsatisfied respondents (i.e., those who answered either 
“rather unsatisfied” or “very unsatisfied”). The data reported in Figure 1 clearly 
illustrates the huge gap that exists between the city characterised by the lowest level of 
satisfaction—Palermo—and the metropolitan area with the highest reported level of 
satisfaction, Rennes. The same applies to respondents’ preferences: Figure 2 depicts the 
ratio of interviewees who reported using public transport every day and the number of 
respondents who reported doing so either “less than once a month” or “never”. Again, 
Palermo residents reported the lowest use of LPT of any city included in the survey. 
The empirical analysis will also take advantage of information about respondents’ 
characteristics such as age, gender, education, etc., which are available in Flash 
Eurobarometer survey data to control for observable individual characteristics. In our 
models we also control for a set of city-level characteristics—namely per capita GDP as 
expressed in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), unemployment rate and population density. 
All such variables are defined at the NUTS III level and were obtained from the 
Eurostat Regional Database.  
3.2. LPT organisation in EU cities 
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To the best of our knowledge, no source exists that provides complete information 
either about the governance and structure or about the number of LPT providers across 
European cities. We therefore had to build our own database, which drew upon a 
number of sources. By using the websites both of municipalities and LPT service 
providers, as well as the Amadeus database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk, we were 
able to gather data about ticket prices and the characteristics of LPT service providers in 
33 cities across nine European nations.  
The organisation of LPT providers was captured by two dimensions. The first 
concerned the number and ownership of public transport providers. According to this 
criterion, the 33 cities that comprised our sample were classified into three groups. The 
first was composed of those cases—numbering 15 out of the 33—in which a single firm 
supplied all services. The ownership in such instances was typically entirely public, 
although it might also take the form of a public-private partnership in which private 
stakeholders were under the control of a public—usually municipal—institution. The 
second group of 18 cities can be considered as two separate groups of nine cities; one 
such group included those cities in which LPT services were supplied by more than one 
operator. In these cities, all of the service providers were publicly owned; the German 
city railways (the S-bahn) constitute an example of this type—they are fully integrated 
into the public transport network even if they are not all owned by the same firm that 
provides other services such as buses, trams and subways. Finally, the remaining cities 
were characterised by the presence of multiple operators, both publicly and privately 
owned. Table 1 reports the classification of cities according to this criterion. 
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The second dimension across which we were able to capture different organisational 
schemes involved the rules that governed new operators’ entry to the market. As 
mentioned in Section 2, three main models coexist in Europe: full deregulation—
exemplified, in our sample, by the UK apart from London and Belfast; competitive 
tendering—e.g., London, Belfast and France excluding Paris; and the direct 
involvement of transport authorities in supplying LPT services. The number of 
companies can differ across these three types of models. In instances in which 
municipal authorities function as operators, for instance, there can be a public monopoly 
as well as a market split among different publicly and privately owned companies, each 
usually with a low market share. Despite the complex range of empirically observed 
cases (e.g., Van de Velde, 2008), this classificatory scheme represents an attempt to 
assess the impact of deregulation on customer satisfaction. The final column in Table 1 
reports the degree of deregulation of urban LPT services for each city and distinguishes 
between fully deregulated markets (e.g., high level of deregulation), cities in which 
competitive tendering models prevail (medium level), and cities in which public 
authorities are the dominant service providers (low level). 
4. The empirical model 
Eurobarometer respondents were asked to assess their level of satisfaction with each 
service—i.e., whether they were very satisfied, rather satisfied, rather dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied; the responses were only ordinally comparable. As we do not know the 
12 
 
exact level of individual satisfaction, *iS , for each service, we assume that satisfaction 
is generated by a latent variable model: 
*
0 'i i iS e  x β       (1) 
where 1,...,i N  for a sample of N individuals, 1 1' ...i i k ikx x   x β  includes 
individual characteristics that account for observed individual heterogeneity (i.e., 
gender, occupation, etc.) and city-specific variables that account for city-specific 
heterogeneity (i.e., GDP level, city size and population, etc.). We transformed the four-
level individual satisfaction variable into a dichotomous variable, S, which took a value 
equal to 1 if an individual was very or rather satisfied and equal to 0 otherwise.9 Finally, 
ie  is a continuously distributed variable independent of ix  and accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Because *iS  is a latent variable, for each individual, i, one can only 
observe that:  
*1[ 0]i iS S   
                                                 
9 Although the ordinal nature of the four-level individual satisfaction variable could be seen to suggest the 
suitability of using an ordered estimation model, such as an ordered probit, we preferred to transform the 
satisfaction variable into a dichotomous variable for two main reasons. First, it is easier to interpret, as it 
allowed us to distinguish between satisfied and unsatisfied respondents while leaving aside discussions 
concerning the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Second, because the results were easier to present, 
we were therefore able to comment on various different specifications of the estimated model and the 
robustness of results as they depended on the included variables, whereas the marginal effects of ordered 
models would have required the presentation of four columns of estimates—one for each level of 
satisfaction—for each single model specification. However, although not presented here, the main 
conclusions were robust to the estimation of ordered probit models, where the probability of satisfaction 
was measured on a four-item scale; these results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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where1[.]  is equal to 1 if the argument is true and equal to zero otherwise. Assuming 
that ie  is distributed as a standard normal we obtain the probit model: 
*
0
0 0
Pr( 1| ) Pr( 0 | ) Pr( | )
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
S S e
p
      
     
x x β xβ x
β xβ xβ β x   (2) 
where   is the standard normal cumulative density function. The partial effect of 
, 2,...,jx j k , on ( )p x  depends on x through the standard normal density function, 
( ) xβ , as ( ) / ( )j jp x    x xβ . 
We used four  sets of variables as controls: (i) individual demographic characteristics to 
account for individual observed heterogeneity (i.e., respondents’ gender, age, 
occupation status, education, household type, and whether they were born in the same 
city as their current residence); (ii) city-specific aggregate variables (i.e., per capita 
GDP in PPP, population size, city size in square kilometres); (iii) characteristics of 
individuals’ travel (i.e., frequency of use of a given means of transport, time to work); 
(iv) a variable that recorded whether transportation was considered one of the top three 
priorities for the city and an average measure of individual satisfaction on issues other 
than public transport, the aim of which was to account, albeit imperfectly, for the 
idiosyncratic fixed effect that might bias the final estimates; and (v) two sets of dummy 
variables that corresponded to the taxonomy of organisational models and degrees of 
deregulation described in Section 3.2 and listed in Table 1. 
To test the robustness of our estimates, we estimated a set of different specifications of 
the model while also introducing the average fare for a single ticket on public 
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transportation in PPP and the per capita number of cars owned by residents, which 
provided a proxy measure of congestion once we had controlled for population and city 
size. This also allowed us to assess whether satisfaction was negatively correlated with 
the price of a fare and with the level of traffic congestion experienced. Our estimates 
were always clustered at the city level to correct for likely within-city correlations of the 
error term.10 
5. Results 
Table 2 shows the robust marginal effects of the probit model (2) described in the 
previous section. The key group of variables for the current analysis concerns the 
number of service providers; a service franchised to a single firm is taken as a 
reference.11 The first column shows the simplest specification, in which satisfaction 
probability is conditioned by the number of service providers; it shows no significant 
                                                 
10 As our data refer to a sample of approximately 15,000 EU citizens living in a group of 33 European 
cities, it is very likely that heteroskedasticity arose as a consequence of the fact that a respondent living in 
a given city—a cluster, in standard econometric terminology—was likely to share more characteristics 
with a respondent living in the same city than with a respondent living in another city. Estimated 
coefficients remained unbiased and consistent but their standard errors were biased, and clusterisation 
was an effort to correct for this. Although not necessarily the case here, in most applications cluster-
corrected standard errors are larger than standard errors without such corrections, which can lead 
researchers to erroneously or prematurely reject the null assumption of a non-significant coefficient. This 
was the case in our research and we have opted instead to provide estimates with cluster-corrected 
standard errors, this being the more conservative solution because unbiased standard errors and the 
correct assessment of the statistical significance of the main coefficients of interest are crucial to our 
argument (for a standard description and discussion of cluster-corrected standard errors, see Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005). 
11It is a matter of fact in our sample that, when the industry is monopolistic, the franchisee is a publicly 
controlled enterprise. 
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results. Moreover, the likelihood ratio (LR) test suggests that this simple estimated 
model is not significant as its likelihood is not statistically different from that of an 
intercept-only model. However, the coefficient of the number of service providers 
became statistically significant once more complete specifications were estimated 
including, among the regressors, individual characteristics of the respondents, per capita 
GDP in PPP at the city level, population, city size and other variables, including a 
measure of how important LPT was to respondents, their individual overall satisfaction 
(measured as an average of satisfaction in relation to issues other than public transport), 
and the frequency with which they used various modes of transportation and their 
reasons for doing so. These results show that having more than a single provider 
reduced satisfaction by 6–8 per cent as opposed to having only one provider, which is 
consistent with the findings of Fiorio and Florio (2011) concerning the effects of 
liberalisation in the electricity sector. 
In Table 3, we tested similar models distinguishing between cases in which all operators 
were publicly owned and cases in which some were publicly and others were privately 
owned. We found that having access to only a single provider—here, the omitted 
category—was correlated with higher satisfaction compared in particular with many all 
publicly owned providers. However, we found no statistically significant difference 
with services provided by a single provider versus many public and private providers. 
As for the other variables included in the analysis, our results show that per capita 
income, population, city size and even the average fare paid for public transport were 
not statistically significant variables in determining the probability of satisfaction. On 
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the contrary, the number of registered cars—a proxy for congestion—reduced 
satisfaction: inspection of the coefficients suggested that a 1 per cent increase in the 
average number of cars, which would correspond to an increase of approximately 5,000 
cars in a given city, would lead to a 0.55 per cent decrease in the probability of 
satisfaction across all specifications. Respondents who rated transport as one of their top 
three priorities tended to be less satisfied with it,12 whereas respondents who reported 
high levels of satisfaction in the Eurobarometer data set for items other than public 
transport were 18–20 per cent more likely to be satisfied with LPT in their city. Being 
able to reduce the average commute time to the workplace by 10 minutes suggested 
only a 1 per cent increase in satisfaction; those respondents who used LPT more often 
tended to like it more than those who never used it. This evidence was considered 
reasonable at the individual level, as unsatisfied respondents would likely evaluate other 
travel alternatives in order to reduce their use of public transport. 
Finally, the models reported in Table 4 test the relationship between different degrees of 
deregulation and customer satisfaction. The results link competitive tendering 
procedures with the highest levels of satisfaction. It is worth noting that, in all the cities 
included in this category—excepting London—LPT services were provided by a single 
public operator. The dominant role of the public authority was not based on legal 
restrictions, however, as the markets were, from a legal perspective, open to external 
competitors, albeit to varying extents from one city to another. This finding was 
                                                 
12  We also tested models without the variable that recorded whether transportation was one of the 
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consistent with much of the body of literature focused on the British experience, where 
fully and partially-deregulated models coexist. As mentioned in Section 2, most such 
studies have suggested that intermediate levels of deregulation lead to the best results, 
both in terms of efficiency and social welfare (e.g., Preston and Almutairi, 2013; Van de 
Velde and Wallis, 2013). This result is also consistent with the outcomes summarized in 
Table 3, as none of the LPT systems characterised by competitive tendering were 
managed by publicly-owned operators. 
The inclusion of some individual characteristics as further controls largely increased the 
pseudo R-squared across all of the estimated models,13 showing a much improved fit of 
the model to the data on satisfaction. Although detailed results for individual 
characteristics of respondents are not presented here, we can briefly mention our main 
findings.14 All specifications showed that female respondents were less likely to be 
satisfied than males, consistent with the related literature on customer satisfaction (e.g., 
Fiorio et al., 2007); that age was not a significant variable; and that respondents with a 
higher level of education were less likely to report a positive opinion of public transport. 
While no occupation variable was consistently significant across the different 
specifications, single-with-children households were less likely to be satisfied than 
                                                                                                                                               
respondent’s top three priorities and found no significant change in the relevant estimated coefficient. 
13The pseudo R-squared is defined here as 1 01 /L L , where 1L  is the log likelihood of the full, 
estimated model and 0L  is the log likelihood of the model including the constant only (McFadden, 1974). 
It is simply the log likelihood on a scale where 0 corresponds to the constant-only model and 1 
corresponds to perfect prediction for a discrete model (in which case the overall log likelihood is 0). 
14 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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single-with-no-children households. A dummy variable equal to one for respondents 
born in the city in which the interview was conducted and zero otherwise suggested that 
native residents were less satisfied than non-natives. 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has presented new evidence on the satisfaction of LPT users in 33 European 
cities. Our research question was straightforward: Is satisfaction correlated to the 
number of providers of local transport services? 
We found that a monopolistic, integrated service organisation was correlated with 
higher user satisfaction. This finding was statistically significant after controlling for a 
number of individual and local circumstances. In the interpretation of this finding—
which, as far as is known to the authors, represents a novel contribution to the 
literature—there are some important remarks to be considered: 
(i) the Eurobarometer survey was not intended as a direct test of social attitudes 
toward the different dimensions of the public transport service. The question (in 
the English version of the questionnaire) read: “Generally speaking, please tell 
me if you are very satisfied, rather satisfied, rather unsatisfied or not at all 
satisfied with public transport.” Hence we were not testing whether users were 
happy with monopolistic LPT providers or public/private partnerships among 
LPT service providers. Answers to such questions may be biased because of the 
political orientation of respondents or the information available to respondents 
on the ownership of the LPT providers. Here we have been testing only the 
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generic level of customer satisfaction with LPT service, a procedure that can be 
seen as more neutral than something designed to test social attitudes.  
(ii) The EU context offered some variability in the governance model of the service, 
and we sought to take advantage of this feature. Ideally, we would have liked to 
have had a larger number of cities to use in creating governance clusters; this 
will instead have to be left to future research efforts, assuming Eurobarometer or 
other cross-country surveys will be available. 
(iii) The statistical approach used here was well suited to the European urban context 
and can be easily replicated for other regions and cities, provided appropriate 
data are made available. 
The core policy implication of the paper for planners and public administrators is that 
one additional piece of evidence should be added to the long-running debate on the 
advantages and drawbacks of competition in local public transport. In some countries, 
and particularly in the United Kingdom—although not in London (see Glaister 1985, 
2003)—the privatisation of local bus companies has been combined with an attempt to 
introduce competition “within the market”. Elsewhere there has either been 
“competition for the market” (Demsetz, 1968; Crain and Ekelund, 1976), or a continued 
public monopoly. In some cases, licensing a plurality of actors—whether private or 
public—has been a move seen by regulators or city administrators as an advantage 
relative to monopoly, a way to introduce a degree of competition into the system.  
While we have not directly tested the outcome of these reforms, we interpret our 
findings as suggesting that users seem to be more satisfied in instances in which the 
20 
 
LPT systems preserve a strongly integrated structure of provision. If customer 
satisfaction reflects their experience—even if only to a limited extent—then our 
findings can be added, with due caution, to the case in favour of franchised monopoly of 
provision to a single, integrated LPT authority.  
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Figure 1. Public transport: Ratio of satisfied to unsatisfied respondents (Source: European Commission, 2010). 
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Figure 2. Ratio of daily travellers to respondents who use public transport less than once a month (Source: 
European Commission, 2010). 
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Table 1: Public transport in some European cities – some descriptive statistics. 
Country City Single ticket (euro) Organzation Degree of deregulation 
Belgium Antwerpen 1.20 One public provider Low 
Belgium Bruxelles 1.70 One public provider Low 
Belgium Liège 1.40 One public provider Low 
Germany Berlin 1.30 Many providers, all publicly owned Low 
Germany Essen 1.30 One public provider Low 
Germany Hamburg 1.30 Many providers, all publicly owned Low 
Germany Leipzig 1.50 Many providers, all publicly owned Low 
Germany Muenchen 1.20 Many providers, all publicly owned Low 
Spain Barcelona 1.40 Many providers, public and private Low 
Spain Madrid 1.00 Many providers, public and private Low 
Spain Màlaga 1.20 One public provider Low 
France Bordeaux 1.40 One public provider Medium 
France Lille 1.30 One public provider Medium 
France Marseille 1.26 One public provider Medium 
France Paris 1.70 Many providers, public and private Low 
France Rennes 1.20 One public provider Medium 
France Strasbourg 1.40 One public provider Medium 
Ireland Dublin 1.50 Many providers, public and private Low 
Italy Bologna 1.00 One public provider Low 
Italy Napoli 1.10 Many providers, all publicly owned Low 
Italy Palermo 1.30 Many providers, all publicly owned Low 
Italy Roma 1.00 Many providers, all publicly owned Low 
Italy Torino 1.00 One public provider Low 
Italy Verona 1.10 One public provider Low 
Portugal Braga 1.35 One public provider Low 
Portugal Lisboa 0.85 Many providers, all publicly owned Low 
United Kingdom Belfast 1.67 One public provider Medium 
United Kingdom Cardiff 1.79 Many providers, public and private High 
United Kingdom Glasgow 1.43 Many providers, public and private High 
United Kingdom London 2.15 Many providers, public and private Medium 
United Kingdom Newcastle 1.67 Many providers, public and private High 
Austria Wien 1.80 Many providers, public and private Low 
Austria Graz 1.90 Many providers, all publicly owned Low 
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Table 2: Marginal effects of satisfaction with public transport: One public provider versus many providers. 
Dep. var.: Satisfied with the use of public transport 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Many providers -0.055 -0.062 -0.059* -0.075** -0.075** 
(0.316) (0.305) (0.090) (0.011) (0.012) 
Per capita GDP (in PPP) 0.004 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.125) (0.409) (0.970) (0.955) 
City size (in million sq. km) -0.054 -0.074 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.755) (0.334) (0.983) (0.990) 
Population size (in million) 0.003 0.011 -0.007 -0.007 
(0.928) (0.526) (0.596) (0.600) 
Commute to work by public 
transport   0.010 0.017 0.017 
(0.488) (0.230) (0.215) 
Time to work -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: Less than 1x 
per month   0.119*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: At least 1x per 
month   0.156*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: At least 1x per 
week   0.200*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: Daily 0.196*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transit is one of respondent’s top 3 
priorities   -0.139*** -0.133*** -0.133*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Individual overall satisfaction 0.215*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of cars (in million) -0.478*** -0.476*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Fare  0.003 
(0.956) 
Individual characteristics no  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 14,926 14,537 13,973 13,973 13,973 
Log-likelihood -8024 -7574 -6277 -6184 -6184 
Pseudo R-squared 0.004 0.033 0.169 0.181 0.181 
LR test P-value 0.302 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: calculations were conducted on Flash Eurobarometer data. Omitted variables were: does not work; frequency of 
use: never; one provider; transportation not listed among respondent’s top 3 priorities; and city is not congested. 
Individual characteristics include: gender, education, age, employment status, household type and born in the city. 
Robust p values in parentheses. Errors corrected for clusters at the city level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Marginal effects of satisfaction with public transport. One public provider versus more than one public 
or more than one public and private provider. 
Dep. var.: Satisfied with the use of public transport 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Many providers, all publicly owned -0.138 -0.126 -0.101** -0.106** -0.106** 
(0.131) (0.119) (0.030) (0.010) (0.011) 
Many providers, public and private 0.030 0.027 -0.004 -0.035 -0.035 
(0.398) (0.595) (0.912) (0.290) (0.296) 
Per capita GDP (in PPP) 0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.173) (0.673) (0.691) (0.697) 
City size (in million sq. km) 0.062 -0.001 0.043 0.043 
(0.748) (0.994) (0.467) (0.465) 
Population size (in million) -0.028 -0.009 -0.019 -0.019 
(0.499) (0.649) (0.183) (0.185) 
Commute to work by public 
transport   0.014 0.019 0.019 
(0.320) (0.175) (0.161) 
Time to work -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: Less than 1x 
per month   0.115*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: At least 1x per 
month   0.152*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: At least 1x per 
week   0.195*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: Daily 0.194*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transit is one of respondent’s top 3 
priorities   -0.140*** -0.134*** -0.134*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Individual overall satisfaction 0.208*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of cars (in million) -0.430*** -0.428*** 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Fare  0.005 
(0.933) 
Individual characteristics no  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 14,926 14,537 13,973 13,973 13,973 
Log-likelihood -7865 -7482 -6238 -6165 -6165 
Pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.045 0.174 0.183 0.183 
LR test P-value 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: calculations were conducted on Flash Eurobarometer data. Omitted variables were: does not work; frequency of 
use: never; one provider; transportation not listed among respondent’s top 3 priorities; and city is not congested. 
Individual characteristics include: gender, education, age, employment status, household type and born in the city. 
Robust p values in parentheses. Errors corrected for clusters at the city level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Marginal effects of satisfaction with public transport. Low vs. medium or high levels of deregulation. 
Dep. var.: Satisfied with the use of public transport 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Deregulation: medium 0.133*** 0.145*** 0.108*** 0.098*** 0.102*** 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) 
Deregulation: high  0.134*** 0.127*** 0.045** -0.022 -0.026 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.031) (0.462) (0.423) 
Per capita GDP (in PPP) 0.004* 0.001 0.000 0.001 
(0.051) (0.203) (0.714) (0.578) 
City size (in million sq. km) 0.006 -0.028 0.032 0.030 
(0.974) (0.752) (0.591) (0.604) 
Population size (in million) -0.022 -0.013 -0.030* -0.030* 
(0.573) (0.533) (0.099) (0.087) 
Commute to work by public 
transport   0.014 0.014 0.013 
(0.377) (0.322) (0.350) 
Time to work -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: less than 1x 
per month   0.112*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: at least 1x per 
month   0.150*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: at least 1x per 
week   0.195*** 0.183*** 0.182*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Frequency of usage: Daily 0.198*** 0.186*** 0.184*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transit is one of respondent’s top 3 
priorities   -0.145*** -0.136*** -0.136*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Individual overall satisfaction 0.202*** 0.186*** 0.188*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of cars (in million) -0.429*** -0.449*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Fare  -0.039 
(0.529) 
Individual characteristics no  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 14,926 14,537 13,973 13,973 13,973 
Log-likelihood -7884 -7429 -6226 -6159 -6156 
Pseudo R-squared 0.021 0.052 0.175 0.184 0.185 
LR test P-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: calculations were conducted on Flash Eurobarometer data. Omitted variables were: does not work; frequency of 
use: never; one provider; transportation not listed among respondent’s top 3 priorities; and city is not congested. 
Individual characteristics include: gender, education, age, employment status, household type and born in the city. 
Robust p values in parentheses. Errors corrected for clusters at the city level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A. List of variables. 
Name Description Source 
Variables at the individual level 
Commute to 
work 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent uses public transport to go 
to his/her place of employment and equal to 0 otherwise 
European 
Commission, 2010 
Time to work 
Time (in minutes) needed by the respondent to reach their place of work European 
Commission, 2010 
Frequency of 
usage 
Set of dummy variables equal to 1 if the respondent used public transport 
less than once per month/at least once per month/at least once per 
week/daily/never, respectively 
European 
Commission, 2010 
Transit is one of 
top 3 priorities 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent included public transport 
among the most important issues for the city and equal to 0 otherwise 
European 
Commission, 2010 
Individual overall 
satisfaction 
Average score of individual satisfaction on the issues covered in the 
survey apart from public transport. These issues include health care, 
sport, culture, beauty of streets, buildings, public spaces and green 
spaces, and outdoor recreation  
European 
Commission, 2010 
Variables at city-level 
Per capita GDP Per capita GDP as measured in Parity Purchasing Power (PPP) Eurostat (2012) 
City size Size of the city, expressed in millions of square kilometres Eurostat (2012) 
Population size Number of residents in the city Eurostat (2012) 
Number of cars Per capita number of registered cars in the city Eurostat (2012) 
Fare  Price of a public transport ticket Operators’ websites 
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Appendix 
 
This appendix shows Tables 2–4 and also includes coefficients regarding the individual 
characteristics, as per the request of an anonymous referee. However, we do not suggest publishing 
these in the final version of this paper.  
 
Table 4A: Marginal effects of satisfaction with public transport. One public provider versus many providers. 
Dep. var.: Satisfied with the use of public transport 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Many providers -0.055 -0.062 -0.059* -0.075** -0.075** 
(0.316) (0.305) (0.090) (0.011) (0.012) 
Per capita GDP (in PPP) 0.004 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.125) (0.409) (0.970) (0.955) 
City size (in million sq. km) -0.054 -0.074 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.755) (0.334) (0.983) (0.990) 
Population size (in million) 0.003 0.011 -0.007 -0.007 
(0.928) (0.526) (0.596) (0.600) 
Commute to work 0.010 0.017 0.017 
(0.488) (0.230) (0.215) 
Time to work -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Less than 1x per month 0.119*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
At least 1x per month 0.156*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
At least 1x per week 0.200*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Daily 0.196*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transit is one of respondent’s top 3 
priorities   -0.139*** -0.133*** -0.133*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Individual overall satisfaction 0.215*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fare of mass transit (in PPP) 0.003 
(0.956) 
Number of cars (in million) -0.478*** -0.476*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Female -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.953) (0.293) (0.789) (0.792) 
High school 0.005 -0.011 -0.016 -0.016 
(0.721) (0.379) (0.207) (0.189) 
College -0.019 -0.023 -0.024 -0.025* 
(0.342) (0.149) (0.105) (0.100) 
Employee 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.005 
(0.468) (0.562) (0.747) (0.746) 
Manual-worker -0.015 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 
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(0.376) (0.442) (0.522) (0.526) 
Student 0.063*** 0.020 0.025 0.025 
(0.000) (0.254) (0.130) (0.130) 
Unemployed 0.043** 0.016 0.015 0.015 
(0.031) (0.528) (0.565) (0.567) 
Not working 0.033* 0.014 0.019 0.019 
(0.072) (0.523) (0.397) (0.396) 
Couple -0.024** -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.015) (0.392) (0.899) (0.902) 
Single with kids -0.066*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
(0.000) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Couple with kids -0.057*** -0.019** -0.005 -0.005 
(0.000) (0.048) (0.604) (0.611) 
Other family types -0.097*** -0.056*** -0.029** -0.028** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.047) 
Born in the city -0.057*** -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.021** 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) 
Observations 14,926 14,537 13,973 13,973 13,973 
Log-likelihood -8024 -7574 -6277 -6184 -6184 
Pseudo R-squared 0.004 0.033 0.169 0.181 0.181 
LR test P-value 0.302 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: calculations were conducted on Flash Eurobarometer data. Omitted variables were: does not work; frequency of 
use: never; one provider; transportation is not listed among respondent’s top 3 priorities; city is not congested; male; 
primary school; self-employed; single; and born in another city. 
 
Robust p values in parentheses. Errors corrected for clusters at the city level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5A: Marginal effects of satisfaction with public transport. One public provider versus more than one 
public or more than one public and private provider. 
 
Dep. var.: Satisfied with the use of public transport 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Many providers, all publicly owned -0.138 -0.126 -0.101** -0.106** -0.106** 
(0.131) (0.119) (0.030) (0.010) (0.011) 
Many providers, public and private 0.030 0.027 -0.004 -0.035 -0.035 
(0.398) (0.595) (0.912) (0.290) (0.296) 
Per capita GDP (in PPP) 0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.173) (0.673) (0.691) (0.697) 
City size (in million sq. km) 0.062 -0.001 0.043 0.043 
(0.748) (0.994) (0.467) (0.465) 
Population size (in million) -0.028 -0.009 -0.019 -0.019 
(0.499) (0.649) (0.183) (0.185) 
Commute to work 0.014 0.019 0.019 
(0.320) (0.175) (0.161) 
Time to work -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Less than 1x per month 0.115*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
At least 1x per month 0.152*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
At least 1x per week 0.195*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Daily 0.194*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transit is one of respondent’s top 3 
priorities   -0.140*** -0.134*** -0.134*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Individual overall satisfaction 0.208*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fare of mass transit (in PPP) 0.005 
(0.933) 
Number of cars (in million) -0.430*** -0.428*** 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Female -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.601) (0.546) (0.986) (0.994) 
High school 0.010 -0.007 -0.013 -0.013 
(0.466) (0.544) (0.288) (0.256) 
College -0.010 -0.018 -0.021 -0.021 
(0.566) (0.236) (0.150) (0.133) 
Employee 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.003 
(0.863) (0.714) (0.829) (0.828) 
Manual-worker -0.021 -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 
(0.182) (0.350) (0.431) (0.437) 
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Student 0.064*** 0.023 0.026 0.026 
(0.000) (0.154) (0.102) (0.102) 
Unemployed 0.040* 0.016 0.015 0.015 
(0.056) (0.517) (0.559) (0.560) 
Not working 0.028 0.013 0.018 0.018 
(0.136) (0.534) (0.412) (0.411) 
Couple -0.025*** -0.010 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.009) (0.307) (0.763) (0.767) 
Single with kids -0.071*** -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Couple with kids -0.059*** -0.022** -0.009 -0.008 
(0.000) (0.019) (0.362) (0.376) 
Other family types -0.094*** -0.055*** -0.031** -0.030** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.032) 
Born in the city -0.057*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) 
Observations 14,926 14,537 13,973 13,973 13,973 
Log-likelihood -7865 -7482 -6238 -6165 -6165 
Pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.045 0.174 0.183 0.183 
LR test P-value 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: calculations were conducted on Flash Eurobarometer data. Omitted variables were: does not work; frequency of 
use: never; one provider; transportation is not listed among respondent’s top 3 priorities; city is not congested; male; 
primary school; self-employed; single; and born in another city. 
 
Robust p values in parentheses. Errors corrected for clusters at the city level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4A: Marginal effects of satisfaction with public transport. Low vs. medium or high levels of deregulation. 
Dep. var.: Satisfied with the use of public transport 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Deregulation: medium 0.133*** 0.145*** 0.108*** 0.098*** 0.102*** 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) 
Deregulation: high  0.134*** 0.127*** 0.045** -0.022 -0.026 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.031) (0.462) (0.423) 
Per capita GDP (in PPP) 0.004* 0.001 0.000 0.001 
(0.051) (0.203) (0.714) (0.578) 
City size (in million sq. km) 0.006 -0.028 0.032 0.030 
(0.974) (0.752) (0.591) (0.604) 
Population size (in million) -0.022 -0.013 -0.030* -0.030* 
(0.573) (0.533) (0.099) (0.087) 
Commute to work 0.014 0.014 0.013 
(0.377) (0.322) (0.350) 
Time to work -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Less than 1x per month 0.112*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
At least 1x per month 0.150*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
At least 1x per week 0.195*** 0.183*** 0.182*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Daily 0.198*** 0.186*** 0.184*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transit is one of respondent’s top 3 
priorities   -0.145*** -0.136*** -0.136*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Individual overall satisfaction 0.202*** 0.186*** 0.188*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of cars (in million) -0.429*** -0.449*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Fare of mass transit (in PPP) -0.039 
(0.529) 
Female -0.026*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.162) (0.858) (0.898) (0.943) 
High school 0.000 -0.014 -0.018 -0.017 
(0.997) (0.266) (0.129) (0.169) 
College -0.018 -0.023 -0.027* -0.025* 
(0.310) (0.123) (0.063) (0.088) 
Employee -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.887) (0.927) (0.946) (0.975) 
Manual-worker -0.007 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 
(0.692) (0.503) (0.554) (0.512) 
Student 0.068*** 0.023 0.024 0.023 
(0.000) (0.178) (0.160) (0.168) 
Unemployed 0.049*** 0.020 0.016 0.015 
(0.009) (0.400) (0.510) (0.556) 
Not working 0.026 0.010 0.013 0.012 
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(0.148) (0.645) (0.530) (0.566) 
Couple -0.012 -0.002 0.003 0.003 
(0.196) (0.856) (0.782) (0.801) 
Single with kids -0.069*** -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
Couple with kids -0.043*** -0.013 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.001) (0.173) (0.802) (0.732) 
Other family types -0.075*** -0.045*** -0.024* -0.027* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.053) 
Born in the city -0.045*** -0.020** -0.017** -0.018** 
(0.001) (0.018) (0.044) (0.043) 
Observations 14,926 14,537 13,973 13,973 13,973 
Log-likelihood -7884 -7429 -6226 -6159 -6156 
Pseudo R-squared 0.021 0.052 0.175 0.184 0.185 
LR test P-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: calculations were conducted on Flash Eurobarometer data. Omitted variables were: does not work; frequency of 
use: never; low level of deregulation; transportation is not listed among respondent’s top 3 priorities; city is not 
congested. Individual characteristics include: gender, education, age, employment status, household type, born in the 
city. 
 
Robust p values in parentheses. Errors corrected for clusters at the city level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
